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2INTRODUCTION
[T]he gap between the burgeoning hundreds of international 
environmental laws and the actual condition of the environment – [is] 
perhaps one of the largest contradictions of our time.
Alexander Gillespie, “International Environmental Law and 
Policy”1
The high number of multilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”) negotiated by 
the international community is impressive.  There are over 500 MEAs, covering such 
diverse issues as loss of biological diversity, pollution of the atmosphere, ocean 
degradation and deforestation.2  Moreover, the commentators suggest that compliance 
with the obligations agreed to in MEAs is generally high.3  Yet, despite the large number 
of MEAs, and high compliance rate, there is growing concern that the state of the 
environment continues to deteriorate at an unprecedented scale.4
One reaction to the observation that MEAs are not effectively addressing 
environmental problems has been a call to intensify the obligations assumed by the 
parties to MEAs.  That is, resolution of global environmental problems requires “deeper 
1
 Alexander Gillespie, International Environmental Law and Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A 
SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 67, 77 (Klaus Bosselmann & David Grinlinton eds., 2002).
2 International Environmental Governance Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Summary, U.N. 
Environment Programme, 1st mtg., Provisional Agenda Item 3 at 3, UNEP/IGM/1/INF/1 (2001) at
http://www.unep.org/IEG/docs/working%20documents/MEA_summary/IGM-1-INF-1.doc.  See the 
ECOLEX website at http://www.ecolex.org/ and the Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators 
website at http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/ for current information on the number and diversity of MEAs.
3
 E.g. David D. Victor, Enforcing international law: implications for an effective global warming regime, 
10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 147, 151 (1999).
4
 For example, Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT’L L.
259, 263 (1992) comments there is a strong argument that despite the proliferation of MEAs, “the 
environmental situation in the world became worse and is deteriorating further.”  See also Jacqueline Peel, 
New State Responsibility Rules and Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Obligations: Some Case 
Studies of How the New Rules Might Apply in the International Environmental Context, 10 REV. EUR. 
COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 82 (2001); Victor, id.
3cooperation.”5  The most recent example of this is the climate change regime.  To 
respond to the problem of global warming, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change6 (“FCCC”) outlines a framework of action for Parties to stabilize 
greenhouse gas emissions.7  At the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties 
however, the adequacy of the commitments in the FCCC was a critical issue.8  The 
Parties entered negotiations to strengthen efforts to address global climate change 
resulting in the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol.9  In contrast to the FCCC, which merely 
encouraged Parties to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions, the Kyoto Protocol sets 
quantifiable greenhouse emission limitation and reduction commitments for certain 
developed country Parties.10
  The introduction of emission commitments in the Kyoto Protocol was accompanied 
by negotiations concerning not only how to ensure compliance with those commitments, 
5 Depth of cooperation refers to the extent to which a treaty “requires states to depart from what they would 
have done in its absence.” George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the good news 
about compliance good news about cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 383 (1996).  See discussion below 
under the heading “The Enforcement Model: Political Economics Theory.”
6
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 31 I.L.M. 
849 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/conv/conv.html [hereinafter 
FCCC]. 
7
 Article 2 of the FCCC.
8
 Joanna Depledge, Tracing the Origins of the Kyoto Protocol: An Article-By-Article Textual History, 
Prepared under contract to UNFCC, FCCC/TP/2000/2 (2000) 6, at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/tp/tp0200.pdf.  See also International Institute for Sustainable Development, 
Summary of the First Conference of the Parties for the Framework Convention on Climate Change: 28 
March – 7 April (1995) 12(21) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. 1, at
http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/download/pdf/enb1221e.pfd.
9
 The Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22  (not 
yet in force), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf  [hereinafter the Kyoto 
Protocol].  To enter into force the Kyoto Protocol requires ratification by 55 Parties to the FCCC including 
Annex I parties accounting for at least 55 percent of the total carbon dioxide emissions of that group in 
1990 (Article 25).  Presently, 110 parties have ratified the Kyoto Protocol representing 43.9 per cent of 
total carbon dioxide emissions.  FCCC website at http://unfccc.int/ (last modified on June 6, 2003).  Given 
the current position of the United States against ratification, to enter into force the Kyoto Protocol will need 
Russia’s ratification.
10
 Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
4but also possible enforcement mechanisms in the case of non-compliance.11  Despite the 
reportedly high compliance rate with many other MEAs, in the face of binding emission 
commitments in the Kyoto Protocol, the Parties wanted assurance that these would be 
backed by a credible compliance system.12  However, this increased attention to 
compliance is not restricted to the climate change regime.  It is part of a recent 
development in the negotiation of MEAs to introduce treaty specific compliance regimes, 
as well as to introduce enforcement mechanisms.13  Therefore, the question addressed in 
this paper is: is stronger enforcement necessary to secure compliance with MEAs?
To consider that question, this article reviews the recent literature on compliance with 
international law and applies the leading theories to MEAs.  This literature increased 
dramatically at the end of the last century as scholars from various disciplines including 
law, political science and political economics endeavored to explain the causal link 
between state behavior and compliance with international law.14   The scholars sought an 
answer to the compliance question: “why do nations obey international law?”15
11
 Fiona Mullins, Kyoto Mechanisms, Monitoring and Compliance From Kyoto to the Hague: A selection of 
recent OECD and IEA analyses on the Kyoto Protocol, Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Paris (2001) 41, at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00023000/M00023447.pdf. 
12
 G.H. Addink, Working Paper for the 10th session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, Joint Working Group Compliance on the Kyoto 
Protocol: An Overview of Suggestions on Compliance 8 (1999) at
http://www.library.uu.nl/publarchief/jb/artikel/addink/full.pdf.  In general the traditional international law 
remedies are viewed as inadequate to secure compliance with MEAs.  See discussion below under the 
heading: “I. Conceptual Framework: B. The Starting Block.”
13
 M. A. Fitzmaurice & C. Redgwell, Environmental Non-Compliance Procedures and International Law, 
31 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 35, 42 (2000).
14 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK, 
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995); George W. Downs et al., supra note 5; Oran 
R. Young et al., Regime Effectiveness: Taking Stock, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 249 (Oran R. Young ed., 1999).  For a summary of earlier theories on 
compliance and international law see Harold Hongju Koh, Why do nations obey international law?, 106 
YALE L.J. 2599, 2603 (1997).
15
 Koh, id.
5This discussion is divided into three parts.  Part I sets up a conceptual framework for 
understanding the literature.  First, I define the terms “compliance,” “enforcement” and 
“effective.”  Secondly, I set out the underlying assumptions most authors make either 
explicitly or implicitly, before they consider the compliance question.
Part II of this discussion sets out the compliance continuum16 by identifying the 
contemporary schools of thought on why nations comply with international law:  the 
managerial school, fairness theory, transnational legal process, reputational theory, 
international relations theory and the enforcement model.  In considering each theory, I 
outline what the scholars tell us about the compliance question, focusing specifically on 
MEAs.  I also consider what each theory tells us about whether enforcement is a 
necessary component of a compliance regime in the MEA context.
Part III of this discussion then provides an analysis of the literature, noting where the 
theories converge, the key points of contention among the leading scholars, and 
suggestions for further research.
In sum, based on the current literature, my conclusion is that in general, nations 
comply with MEAs because of shallow cooperation; states spend significant time and 
resources negotiating agreements reflecting no more that current domestic policies.  This 
explains the observation that global environmental degradation is continuing despite the 
16
 See Fitzmaurice & Redgwell, supra note 13, at 42 who refer to the compliance ‘continuum’ in the 
context of analyzing non-compliance procedures.
6high compliance rate with MEAs.  Therefore, to meaningfully address global 
environmental problems, we must introduce more onerous obligations in MEAs, thereby 
increasing the depth of our co-operation.  However, ensuring compliance with increased 
obligations requires not only stronger, but legitimate enforcement mechanisms, as 
illegitimacy was one of the primary justifications for theories against the use of stronger 
enforcement mechanisms.  By creating stronger, legitimate enforcement mechanisms, we 
may be able to move beyond compliance, and begin to tackle the issue of effectiveness in 
international environmental law.  
I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A. Definitions
The key terms used in the literature are “compliance,” “enforcement” and 
“effectiveness.”  These concepts are discussed below. 
Compliance refers to whether states meet their obligations in an accord,17 or put 
another way, whether their behavior conforms with legal rules.18  These obligations can 
be both procedural, such as a requirement to report, and substantive, such as an 
undertaking to control an activity.19   Additionally, some scholars extend the concept of 
compliance to incorporate whether the spirit or intent of the treaty has been met,20
17
 Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: 
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 1, 4 (Edith Brown Weiss 
& Harold K. Jacobson, eds., 1998) [hereinafter ENGAGING COUNTRIES].
18
 Note however, the concept is not uncontested.  See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a 
Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH 
NONBINDING ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997) 49 who argues that the meaning of compliance 
“cannot be taken as shared,” but depends on which legal theory of international law is applied. 
19
 Weiss & Jacobson, supra note 17.
20 Id.
7although this conceptualization presents obvious empirical analysis difficulties.21  A 
compliance mechanism is a provision in a treaty designed to encourage compliance, 
including positive incentives such as financial or technical assistance. 
In contrast, enforcement is the implementation of consequences for non-compliance 
with obligations in an accord.22  These consequences can vary from financial penalties, 
the withdrawal of privileges, or sanctions including trade, military and economic 
sanctions.23  Enforcement can either be external to the international agreement, or part of 
a treaty specific non-compliance procedure.24  A compliance regime may incorporate 
both compliance and enforcement mechanisms, as both are designed to secure 
compliance.25
21
 Ronald B. Mitchell, Compliance Theory: An Overview, in IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3, 5 (James Cameron, Jacob Werksman & Peter Roderick, eds., 
1996).
22
 See George W. Downs, Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 319, 320 
(1998) who notes that in political economic literature “enforcement generally refers to the overall strategy 
that a State or a multilateral adopts to establish expectations in the minds of state leaders and bureaucrats 
about the nature of the negative consequences that will follow from noncompliance.”  He comments that 
international lawyers tend to focus only on formal enforcement provisions under international law, rather 
than “extra-legal” enforcement strategies.
23
 See Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Assessing the Record and Designing Strategies to 
Engage Countries, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 17, at 511, 542-547 for a discussion of different 
strategies for encouraging compliance.
24
 See Fitzmaurice & Redgwell, supra note 13 at 36 who note recent MEAs incorporating non-compliance 
procedures include, inter alia, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 
1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989), available at
http://www.unep.ch/ozone/pdf/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf  [hereinafter the Montreal Protocol], and the 
Kyoto Protocol.
25
 See for example, the Kyoto Protocol compliance regime in the Report of the Conference of the Parties on 
its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh from Oct. 29 to Nov. 10, 2001, Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken 
by the Conference of the Parties, Decision 24/CP.7, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance 
under the Kyoto Protocol, at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a03.pdf which sets up a compliance 
committee with a facilitative branch and an enforcement branch.
8Securing compliance, however, does not guarantee the effectiveness of the 
international agreement; effectiveness goes beyond adherence to legal obligations.26
Raustiala identifies the “common-sense notion” of effectiveness is whether the treaty 
solves “the underlying problem.”27  Ehrmann suggests that in the MEA context 
effectiveness refers to, “whether the condition of the environment is improved.”28  Yet, 
although the problem-solving definition of effectiveness is intuitive, there may be many 
factors that contribute to resolving an environmental problem.  The difficulty lies in 
isolating the role of an MEA.29  Accordingly, many scholars ask a different question in 
considering the effectiveness of an MEA, namely, whether the MEA contributed to 
influencing a change in behavior.30  Finally, although compliance and effectiveness are 
conceptually distinct, Mitchell observes, “compliance can provide a valuable proxy for 
effectiveness … .”31  Several authors consider that understanding why nations comply 
with international law can help in analyzing how to increase the effectiveness of 
international law.32
B. The Starting Block
Current academic thought on the compliance question begins from the same starting 
block: the claim that based on empirical observations compliance with international law 
26
 See Fitzmaurice & Redgwell, supra note 13, at 43 n.35.
27 Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 387, 393 (2000).  See also Arild Underdal, One Question, Two Answers, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGIME EFFECTIVENESS 3, 4 (Miles et al. eds. 2002).
28
 Markus Ehrmann, Procedures of Compliance Control in International Environmental Treaties, 13 COLO. 
J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 377, 377 (2002). Note Ehrmann, at 378 defines effectiveness to incorporate the 
problem solving meaning and also whether a treaty can change behavior.
29
 Raustiala, supra note 27, at 393 and 394.
30 Id. at 394.  
31
 Mitchell, supra note 21, at 25.
32 See e.g. Raustiala, supra note 27, at 412.
9is high.33   Most authors agree that the famous assertion by Louis Henkin that, “almost all 
nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their 
obligations almost all of the time,”34 is an accurate description of contemporary state 
behavior.35  The field of international environmental law is often cited to support this 
claim.36  For example, a study by Weiss and Jacobson on compliance with MEAs found 
that for the five treaties studied, compliance was comparable, or better than compliance 
with national laws and regulations within the United States, and with Community 
regulations and directives within the European Union.37
Linked to the observation that nations generally comply with international law, is a 
general consensus that understanding why they comply is one of the central questions 
currently challenging international legal scholarship.  As Guzman comments: 
33 Victor, supra note 3; Koh, supra note 14; Downs, supra note 5. 
34 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed., 1979) (emphasis omitted). 
35
 Note many authors omit, as I have, the introductory words to Henkin’s quote “[i]t is probably the case 
that” E.g. Koh, supra  note 13, at 2599; Kyle Danish, Management v. Enforcement-The New Debate on 
Promoting Treaty Compliance, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 789 (1997).  However, this claim is not entirely 
uncontested.  See Peter M. Haas, Why Comply, Or Some Hypotheses in Search of an Analyst, in
INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS, supra note 18, at 21, 23; Peel, supra note 4, at 
82.  Note also that the area of human rights provides a disturbing exception to the conventional view that 
international law is complied with. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 14, at 16.  
36
 Chayes & Chayes, id.; Victor, supra note 3.
37 Supra note 23, at 512.  The five treaties covered by the study are: World Heritage Convention, Nov. 16, 
1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 (entered into force Dec. 17, 1975), available at 
http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/world.heritage.1972.html; Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 
(entered into force July 1, 1975), available at
http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/cites.trade.endangered.species.1973.html; Convention on the Prevention 
of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (the London Convention of 1972), Dec. 29, 
1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 (entered into force Aug. 30, 1975) available at 
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu:9080/entri/texts/marine.pollution.dumping.of.wastes.1972.html; 1983 
International Tropical Timber Agreement, Nov. 18, 1983, Misc 11 (1984); Cmnd 9240 (entered into force 
Apr. 1, 1985) available at http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/tropical.timber.1983.html and the Montreal 
Protocol.
10
[T]he failure to understand the compliance decision is troubling because 
compliance is one of the most central questions in international law.  Indeed, the 
absence of an explanation for why states obey international law in some instances 
but not others threatens to undermine the very foundations of the discipline.38
The question is central to international law “from both a theoretical and practical 
perspective … .” 39 From a practical perspective, we need to understand why nations
comply to know how to design international accords to ensure future compliance.40
Furthermore, we have no assurance that compliance will remain high if we do not 
understand the causal link.   From a theoretical perspective, the question is fundamental 
because if compliance with international law is merely a coincidence, it begs the question 
why have international law at all.     
The final point of consensus in the compliance literature relates to the inadequacy of 
the Law of State Responsibility to either explain the high compliance rate, or to secure 
compliance with MEA obligations.  The Law of State Responsibility prescribes the legal 
consequences and the procedures for implementing those consequences for breach of an 
international legal obligation, in the absence of specific provision in an international 
agreement.41  However, in general this law is viewed as unsuitable to enforce MEAs.42
38
 Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1826 
(2002).
39
 Koh, supra note 14, at 2599.  See also Victor, supra note 3, at 164: “[a]t stake is not only a theory of 
compliance, but also dramatically different policy prescriptions for how to design effective mechanisms for 
addressing non-compliance.” 
40
 Jose E. Alvarez, Why Nations Behave, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 303, 305 (1998).
41
 See the Draft Articles on Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International 
Law Commission Fifty Third Session, GA Fifty-Sixth Session, Supp. No. 10 (A/56/10) (2001) at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2001/2001report.htm.
11
One of the difficulties with the Law of State Responsibility is identifying a state injured 
by breach of an MEA obligation. 43  This is evident in the case of environmental damage 
caused by the cumulative effects of activities by multiple states, such as ozone depletion 
or global warming.44  Moreover, the remedies of restitution or compensation under the 
Law of State Responsibility are inappropriate in the environmental context, particularly 
where the aim of a regime is to prevent irreversible environmental damage.45  Therefore, 
although not all authors explicitly discuss this issue, it seems reasonable to infer the high 
compliance rate with international law is not explained by a fear of the general sanctions 
under the Law of State Responsibility.46  This inference is also supported by the trend in 
MEA negotiations to introduce non-compliance procedures.47
Overall, scholars generally agree that compliance with international law is high, 
especially with MEAs.  However, the Law of State Responsibility does not explain the 
high compliance levels.  Therefore, we need an adequate explanation of why compliance 
is high, to encourage future compliance, especially as the obligations agreed to in MEAs 
increase, as well as to justify the existence of international law.  The literature differs on 
explanations for the “why” question.  While most authors begin from the same starting 
block, they take different paths on the compliance continuum.
42 See Martti Koskenniemi, Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections on the Enforcement of the 
Montreal Protocol, 3 Y.B. INT’L ENV. L. 123 (1992); Ehrmann, supra note 28 at 379.
43
 Jacob Werksman, Compliance and the Kyoto Protocol: Building a Backbone into a “Flexible” Regime, 9 
Y.B. INT’L ENV. L. (1999) 48, 60.
44
 Ehrmann, supra note 28 at 380.
45
 Fitzmaurice & Redgwell, supra note 13.
46
 Note that the law of treaties is another traditional avenue available under international law to secure 
compliance.  In the climate change context there are similar difficulties associated with the law of treaties 
as for the Law of State Responsibility. Werksman, supra note 43, at 58.
47
 The Kyoto Protocol provides the most recent example of this.  Fitzmaurice & Redgwell, supra note 13.
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II. THE COMPLIANCE CONTINUUM
The compliance continuum is the range of theories explaining why nations comply 
with international law.  It is bordered at one end by the managerial school of Abram and 
Antonia Chayes, and at the other by the enforcement model of George Downs.  The 
continuum represents a general transition from legal theorists relying on normative 
arguments and against using enforcement to secure compliance with international law, to 
political economists relying on instrumentalist arguments who advocate for the use of 
enforcement in instances where the stakes are high.  Moreover, as the debate moves more 
towards supporting enforcement, effectiveness becomes a key focus, rather than just 
compliance with international law, especially in the MEA context.  
A. The Managerial School: Or the “Chayesian approach”
The New Sovereignty by Abram and Antonia Chayes marks one end of the compliance 
continuum and the start of the contemporary discussion on understanding compliance 
with international law. One of the central arguments of The New Sovereignty is that 
coercive enforcement mechanisms are not only rarely used to ensure compliance with 
international treaties, but they are also likely to be ineffective if used.48  According to the 
Chayeses,  “the fundamental instrument for maintaining compliance with treaties at an 
acceptable level is an iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty 
organization, and the wider public.”49  The Chayeses argue that management tools, such 
as transparency, reporting, verification and monitoring, dispute resolution and capacity 
48
 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 14, at 2.
49 Id. at 25.
13
building are the key to designing a compliance regime to encourage compliance.  This 
theory is commonly referred to in the literature as the “managerial school.”50
The managerial school argues that reasons relating to efficiency, interests and norms 
explain the general propensity of states to comply with international law.51  First, 
compliance is an efficient strategy because it saves recalculating the costs and benefits of 
not complying.52  Secondly, it is generally in a state’s self interest to comply, as states are 
unlikely to negotiate and consent to agreements contrary to their interests.53  Finally, 
norms contribute to the general propensity of states to comply.  The Chayeses define 
norms as “prescriptions for action in situations of choice, carrying a sense of obligation, 
a sense that they ought to be followed.”54  They argue that compliance with a treaty is 
motivated by agreement with the norms enunciated in the treaty.55  Also, one of the 
fundamental norms of international law, pacta sunt servanda, “treaties are to be obeyed” 
encourages compliance.  Finally, the managerial school argues that where non-
compliance does occur, this is not the result of willful disobedience. 
The Chayeses identify three factors as the causes of non-compliance with international 
law.  These are ambiguity in the terms of an obligation, lack of capacity to carry out an 
obligation and a change in circumstances.56  Given these factors, coercive enforcement 
would not, according to the managerial school prevent non-compliance.  Sanctions are 
50 E.g. Downs et al., supra note 5, at 379. 
51
 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 14, at 4. 
52 Id.
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 113.
55
 Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes & Ronald B. Mitchell, Managing Compliance: A Comparative 
Perspective, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 17, at 39, 42.
56
 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 14, at 10.
14
futile as a response to non-compliance because of the costs imposed on both the 
sanctioning state and the sanctioned state.  Illegitimacy is also identified by the 
Chayesian approach as explaining the futility of sanctions, particularly where the 
sanctions are imposed unilaterally.  The Chayeses argue that, inter alia, unilateral 
sanctions fail the requirement applicable to all law enforcement: that crucial 
determinations should be made by basically fair procedures.57
At the core of the managerial school of thought is an emphasis on the interdependence 
of the community of states.  The need to belong to that community encourages 
compliance with international norms and therein lies the Chayeses’  “New Sovereignty.”  
They comment that  “[c]onnection to the rest of the world and the political ability to be 
an actor within it are more important than any tangible benefits in explaining compliance 
with international regulatory agreements.”58   Koh captures their thesis as, “the impetus 
of compliance is not so much a nation’s fear of sanction, as it is fear of diminution of 
status through loss of reputation.”59
B. Fairness Theory: Legitimacy and Equity
Thomas Franck’s fairness theory  “admirably mirrors and complements” the 
Chayesian approach to compliance.60  Although Franck does not specifically set out to 
answer the compliance question, he argues that a perception that the law is fair 
57 Id. at 106.
58 Id. at 27.
59 Supra note 14, at 2636. 
60
 Koh, id. at 2644.
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encourages compliance.61  His theory is presented as an analytical framework for a 
critique of international law, where fairness is the defining criterion.  Franck refers to 
such a critique as engaging in fairness discourse.62
Franck defines fairness as having dual components: substantive and procedural.  
Substantive fairness refers to distributive justice, or equity.  While noting the difficulty in 
defining equity, Franck argues that equity is developing into an important aspect of the 
international legal system.63  He contends that the allocation among states of scarce 
resources provides an area where notions of distributive justice are accepted as relevant 
in international law.64
Legitimacy, the second component of Franck’s fairness, refers to “that attribute of a 
rule which conduces to the belief that it is fair because it was made and is applied in 
accordance with ‘right process.’”65  “Right process” is based on the contractarian 
underpinnings of the sources of international law.66  According to Franck, indicators of 
right process or legitimacy are determinacy (the clarity of the rule),67 symbolic validation 
(cues signaling authority),68 coherence (treating like cases alike and relating in a 
61
 As Koh, id. at 2641 notes, Franck’s central question is not why do nations obey international law, but is 
international law fair?
62 Supra, note 14 at 9.
63 Id. at 79.
64 Id. at 56.
65 Id. at 26.
66 Id. at 29.
67 Id. at 30.
68 Id. at 34.
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principled fashion to other rules of the same system),69 and adherence (conformity with 
the international community’s procedural and institutional framework).70
Both aspects of fairness are important to encourage compliance with international law.  
However, Franck recognizes that considerations of equity and legitimacy may not always 
“pull in the same direction.”71  The legitimacy component privileges order, yet equity 
privileges change by incorporating superceding notions of justice where to do so would 
be more distributively just than the established rules.  While acknowledging this 
dichotomy, Franck believes it is not an insurmountable hurdle in the search for fairness.  
Rather, fairness provides the conceptual tool to manage the change-order tension.72
One of Franck’s preconditions for analyzing fairness in international law is a sense of 
community.73  Similar to the Chayesian approach, Franck suggests that sovereignty has a 
new meaning in current international relations owing to the “contemporary state of global 
interdependence.”74  Again, similar to the managerial school, his theory is normative, as 
Franck argues that states obey international law because they believe they ought to.  
Franck relies on the compliance pull of international norms developed through discourse.   
69 Id. at 38.
70 Id. at 41.
71 Id. at 7.
72
 Franck does not set out how fairness manages the two variables, but merely suggests that it is possible.  
But see Gerry J. Simpson, Is International Law Fair?, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 615, 626 (1996) who reviews 
Franck’s theory and notes Koskenniemi (MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE 
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989)) has demonstrated it is impossible to reconcile 
procedural and distributive justice.
73 Supra note 14, at 10.  The other precondition is moderate scarcity, which Franck argues describes the 
existing situation.
74 Id. at 4.  Note this part of Franck’s framework has attracted substantial criticism as many scholars dispute 
the existence of a global community.  Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the 
Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944 (1997); Dino Kritsiotis, 
Imagining the International Community, 13 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 961 (2002).
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“If a decision has been reached by a discursive synthesis of legitimacy and justice, it is 
more likely to be implemented and less likely to be disobeyed.”75  The field of MEAs 
provides useful examples of how according to Franck, this works in practice.
Franck discuses the negotiation of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer (“Vienna Convention”)76 and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer (“Montreal Protocol”) as an example of fairness discourse in 
action.   The ozone agreements created a regime where richer countries help poorer 
countries to meet their undertakings to reduce, and eventually phase out all ozone 
depleting substances.77  Franck argues that this is an acknowledgment of lesser-developed 
countries’ fairness claims: “to exemption, to technology transfer, and to compensatory 
financing.”78  For richer countries, providing the necessary assistance was seen as fair, as 
well as efficient.79  Moreover, Franck suggests that the evidence of a substantial 
reduction in the rate of emissions of ozone-depleting substances by 1993 supports his 
case that fair agreements are more likely to be complied with.80
75 Supra note 14, at 481.  
76
 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293, 26 I.L.M. 
1516 (entered into force Sep. 22, 1988), available at http://www.unep.ch/ozone/vc-text.shtml [hereinafter 
the Vienna Convention]. 
77
 Articles 5, 9 and 10 of the Montreal Protocol.
78
 Supra note 14, at 384. 
79
 Franck id. at 381 comments,  “[t]he industrial world, which at first rejected all resource transfer, came to 
realize that it would be both fair, and ultimately, cheaper, for the rich nations to help the poor to adapt to 
the changes that global ozone layer protection will require of them.”  
80 Id. Note that current figures show the production and consumption of global ozone depleting substances 
has reduced by more than 80 % and that the size of the ozone hole was smaller in 2002.  However, the 
ozone recovery may be attributable to natural atmospheric variations.  International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, Summary of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol and the Sixth 
Conference of the Parties to the Vienna Convention: 25-29 November 2002 19(24) EARTH NEGOTIATIONS 
BULL. (2002) at http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/download/pdf/enb1924e.pdf. 
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In terms of compliance regimes for MEAs in general, Franck’s analysis suggests that 
the current approach is on the right track.  He argues the contemporary approach to 
MEAs including, framework agreements (such as the Vienna Convention, or the FCCC), 
secretariats generating scientific and economic data to assist implementing conferences, 
and third-party processes for resolving disputes create “legitimate and legitimating 
regimes.”81
However, contrary to the Chayeses’ analysis, which explicitly discusses sanctions, the 
efficacy or otherwise of coercive enforcement is not a prominent feature of Franck’s 
fairness theory.  The logical inference of his theory is that if a rule is seen to be fair, then 
coercive enforcement will be unnecessary.  Despite this, he does not explicitly rule out 
sanctions as an effective mechanism to secure compliance in some areas of international 
law.  For example, in the area of collective security, while not supporting the use of 
sanctions, Franck notes they may have had some effect in causing Rhodesia and South 
Africa to comply with international mandates.82   It is a logical extension of Franck’s 
theory that if enforcement is employed, to be effective the mechanism will need 
legitimacy.  Franck’s theory however, has not gone uncriticized.83
81 Supra note 14, at 412.
82 Id. at 290.
83
 For example, Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 487, 493 (1997) comments, “[f]or instance, Franck describes a rule’s compliance ‘pull power’ as 
‘its index of legitimacy.’  Yet legitimacy is said to explain ‘compliance pull,’ making the argument 
circular.”  See also Review Essay Symposium: Thomas M. Franck’s Fairness in International Law and 
Institutions (1995) in 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 901-1030 (2002); Book Reviews: Chin Lim, Managing 
Competing Claims for Distributive Justice and Due Process Within the Contemporary Global Legal Order,
16 LEGAL STUD. 254 (1996); Simpson, supra note 75; Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International 
Institutions, and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944 (1997).
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C. Transnational Legal Process: Koh’s “Missing Link”
Harold Koh argues that while both the Chayeses and Franck provide insights into 
understanding why nations comply with international law, neither theory is complete.84
Koh argues that both theories emphasize voluntary obedience and internalized 
compliance, but neither Franck nor the Chayeses explain how norm-internalization 
occurs.  Koh believes that transnational legal process provides the missing link.85
Transnational legal process is defined by Koh as “the process whereby an international 
law rule is interpreted through the interaction of transnational actors in a variety of law-
declaring fora, then internalized into a nation's domestic legal system.”86  Professor Koh 
views this process as comprised of three phrases.  The process starts with an interaction 
provoked by one or more transnational actors, causing interpretation of an applicable 
global norm.87  Koh notes that the aim of this provocation is not to coerce the other party 
to comply with the norm, but to “internalize the new interpretation of the international 
norm into the other party’s internal normative system.”88  A new legal rule is created 
which will guide transnational interactions between the parties in the future, as well as 
the internalization of these norms through future interactions.89  In sum, the three phases 
are interaction, interpretation, and internalization.90
84
 Koh, supra note 14, at 2602.
85 Id. at 2656.
86
 Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 626 (1998).
87 Supra note 14, at 2646.
88 Id. 
89
 Koh, id., uses as his one of his primary example the Anti-Ballistic Treaty Reinterpretation Debate 
concerning the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 
23 U.S.T. 3435 between the U. S. and the former U.S.S.R., available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html [hereinafter the ABM Treaty].  The ABM 
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Koh’s theory not only explains why nations obey international law, but also suggests a 
course of action for persuading nations to continue to obey.91   Although his essay is a 
preliminary theory as he has a book forthcoming,92 part of Koh’s strategy for encouraging 
compliance includes empowering more actors to participate in the process.93  He also 
proposes that further study of the transnational legal process is required.  Using human 
rights as an example, Koh suggests subjects of inquiry include the role of 
intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private business 
entities and “transnational moral entrepreneurs,” and available fora for norm-enunciation 
and elaboration.94
Similar to Franck, Koh does not engage in the debate about the effectiveness of 
coercive enforcement.   As Koh theorizes that nations obey international law because the 
norms are internalized into domestic legal systems, enforcement through coercive 
mechanisms is not an issue.  Rather, Koh argues that we should seek to acquire a greater 
understanding of the transnational legal process. 
Treaty banned the development of space-based systems for territorial defense.  The U.S. government 
attempted to reinterpret the treaty to allow a proposed Strategic Defense Initiative.  Koh argues that 
transnational legal actors, including a U.S. Senator and non-governmental organizations provoked a series 
of interactions with the U.S. government challenging the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty to allow 
the Strategic Defense Initiative.  This process eventually led to the U.S. government executive branch 
adopting the narrow interpretation and ensured U.S. compliance with international law. 
90 Id.
91 Id. at 2655.
92 HAROLD KOH, WHY NATIONS OBEY: A THEORY OF COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
(forthcoming).
93
 Supra note 14, at 2656.
94 Id. 
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It is not clear however, how transnational legal process applies to MEAs as Koh draws 
most of his examples from the area of human rights and security.  Yet, other authors who 
also note the importance of internalization of international norms have applied the theory 
to the environmental context.  Victor, while not opposed to the use of enforcement 
(discussed below) comments on the significance of transnational legal process in 
encouraging compliance.  He suggests that, “[p]olicymakers could focus commitments on 
‘liberal states’ in which internal public pressure, for example, from environmental 
groups, and robust legal systems make it possible to enforce international commitments 
from inside (ground-up) rather than outside (top-down).”95
Similarly, Young, a prominent international relations theorist emphasizes the 
importance of incorporating international law into domestic politics.96  However, not all 
authors agree that transnational legal process satisfactorily answers the compliance 
question. 
D. Reputational Theory: Rational Self- interested States
A newcomer to the compliance debate, Andrew Guzman challenges the theories of the 
Chayeses, Franck and Koh for inadequately explaining the causal question, why nations 
obey.97  Rather, Guzman argues that all three authors merely assert that they do.98  While 
95 Supra note 4, at 148.
96 Young, supra note 14, at 249, although Young takes a slightly different tack.
97
 Guzman, supra note 38.
98 Id. at 1832 and 1836.    
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still grounded in legal theory, Guzman draws on international relations literature to 
develop a reputational theory of compliance.99
Guzman contends that reputational concerns and direct sanctions explain why states 
comply with international law.100  His theory is founded on a model of rational self-
interested states.101  He argues that states will defect from international law when the 
benefits outweigh the costs, applying classical prisoner’s dilemma game theory in mixed 
motive problems.102  In the domestic setting, law solves the prisoner’s dilemma by 
providing a penalty for defections.103  Guzman argues in international law that sanctions 
prevent defection.  He defines sanctions as “all costs associated with such a failure, 
including punishment or retaliation by other states, and reputation costs that affect a 
state’s ability to make commitments in the future.”104  When the costs of sanctions 
outweigh benefits of defecting, nations will obey the law.  According to Guzman, the 
converse is also true.  When sanctions, including the reputation effect of violating an 
international norm do not outweigh the benefits of complying, states will defect.  
Guzman argues that his theory provides an explanation for non-compliance with 
international law, overlooked by some traditional legal scholarship.105
99
 See Jutta Brunnee and Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem 
Regime Building, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 26 (1997) for another legal theory relevant to compliance, which 
draws on international relations literature. 
100
 Guzman, supra note 38, at 1886.
101 Id. at 1852.
102 Id. at 1847 where Guzman uses the prisoner’s dilemma game model to illustrate the reputational effects.
103 Id. at 1844.
104 Id. at 1845 (emphasis added). 
105 Id. at 1849.
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Given the paucity of existing enforcement mechanisms in international law and MEAs 
in particular, reputation is the key to Guzman’s theory.  He argues that the reputation of a 
state has value.106  For example, a reputation for compliance with international law 
encourages cooperative relations with other states.  Accordingly, violating international 
law compromises that reputation and will affect future relations.  Where, as sometimes 
occurs, a country does not want to foster a reputation for high compliance, direct 
sanctions provide the mechanism for securing compliance.
In putting reputational concerns at the hub of his theory, Guzman’s theory appears 
similar to the Chayeses’ “New Sovereignty.”  The Chayeses make a similar claim that 
part of the answer to the compliance question is that states comply to avoid a bad 
reputation on the world stage.   Where Guzman and the Chayeses differ, is their reasons 
for non-compliance.  Guzman argues states defect where the cost of defection is not as 
great as the benefits.  Conversely, as noted above, the Chayeses argue defection occurs 
because of ambiguity in the terms of the treaty, lack of capacity and a change in 
circumstances.
However, both Guzman and the Chayeses agree that sanctions can be costly (on both 
sanctioned and sanctioning states) and involve issues of legitimacy.  Similar to the 
Chayeses, one of the key legitimacy issues noted by Guzman is that sanctions are 
generally imposed unilaterally by injured party states, rather than by a neutral third 
party.107  Despite this problem, in some situations, sanctions can provide an efficient 
106 Supra note 38, at 1849.
107 Id. at 1867.
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incentive to comply.  Guzman argues that sanctions will work best in bilateral 
relationships, and complex, ongoing relationships.108
Guzman notes that his reputational theory of compliance has its limits.  In areas where 
the stakes are high, such as state security, the compliance pull of maintaining a good 
reputation weakens.109  He argues that loss of reputation will not outweigh the benefits of 
defecting where the issue is of critical importance to the state.110  In the area of trade and 
environmental regulation, however, Guzman asserts the stakes are smaller, and 
international law can have real impact.111
Despite concluding that that environmental regulation is an area where international 
law can have real impact, Guzman does not apply his theory in any depth to international 
environmental law.112  Additionally, Guzman does not consider the argument presented 
in the introduction, that while compliance with MEAs is high, this is in large part because 
of the shallowness of the agreements.  If MEAs are to have any real effect in responding 
to global environmental problems, it appears likely that the depth of cooperation must 
increase.  The Kyoto Protocol provides the most recent example where the Parties have 
introduced more onerous obligations to address the environmental problem.113  That is, 
the stakes have risen and Guzman’s conclusion becomes less applicable.  Here the debate 
108 Id. at 1868.
109 Id. at 1883.
110 Id. at 1874, 1883.
111 Id. at 1885.
112
 To illustrate the practical application of his reputational theory of compliance Guzman, id. at 1851 
discusses bilateral investment treaties and their effect on country behavior.  He argues that international law 
will have greater effect on economic issues than on military issues. 
113
 Werksman, supra note 43, at 49 notes that these commitments “are arguably the most ambitious 
environmental commitments ever set by an international agreement.”
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moves beyond compliance, into addressing the effectiveness of international 
environmental law. 
E. Beyond the Law: International Relations Theory 
The effectiveness of international law, rather than compliance is the traditional 
concern of international relations theorists.114  While a detailed examination of the 
various international relations’ perspectives is beyond the scope of this essay,115 one of 
the leading international relations scholars, Oran Young, engages in the compliance 
debate.116  Young focuses on regimes, defined as “social institutions consisting of agreed 
upon principles, norms, rules, procedures, and programs that govern the interactions of 
actors in specific issue areas.”117   His concern is understanding the effectiveness of 
regimes, measuring effectiveness by behavioral consequences.  That is,  “whether 
regimes or governance systems play a role in shaping or guiding the behavior of those  … 
whose behavior is targeted by a regime’s provisions.”118   Therefore, Young’s analysis is 
focused not on why nations comply, but rather on what are the sources of effective 
regimes.119
114
 See ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 26 for a recent in depth analysis of the 
effectiveness of international environmental law from the perspective of international relations theory.
115See Guzman, supra note 38, at 1836 for a “thumbnail sketch” of three schools of thought in international 
relations literature: neorealist theory, institutionalist theory and liberal theory. 
116 ORAN R.YOUNG, GOVERNANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS (1999); THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES, supra note 14.
117
 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young &  Michael Zurn, The Study of International Regimes, 1 EUR. J. INT’L 
REL. 267, 274 (1995), cited in Young & Levy, The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes, 
in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 1, id, at 1.
118 YOUNG, GOVERNANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS, supra note 116, at 110.
119 Id. at 115 and 117.
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However, despite concentrating on effectiveness, Young engages in the compliance 
debate.   Young’s view is that the management approach to compliance is generally 
preferable to enforcement.  He argues it is simplistic to rely on enforcement to capture 
collective benefits, as the relationship between actor behavior and compliance is more 
complex.120  In an analysis of the effectiveness of several international regimes 
addressing environmental problems, Young and his colleagues identify several 
mechanisms, or behavioral pathways that operate to influence state behavior.121  They 
conclude that all mechanisms influence the effectiveness of regimes, and that the degree 
of influence varies across different regimes.122
Nonetheless, Young falls towards the far end of the compliance continuum as he is not 
entirely opposed to enforcement.  “Rather, [his] analysis suggests that enforcement is 
more important under some conditions than others and that circumstances exist in which 
enforcement mechanisms can operate effectively in the absence of anything we would 
normally call a “government.”123
Again, similar to the Chayeses and Guzman, Young points out that sanctions may pose 
legitimacy concerns.124  Moreover, legitimacy emerges as an important factor in several 
of the regimes identified by Young et al. as effective.  Legitimacy falls under one the 
behavioral mechanisms labeled “Regimes as Bestowers of Authority,” where “social 
norms rooted in considerations of legitimacy or authoritativeness often guide the 
120
 Id. at 106.
121
 Young & Levy, supra note 117, at 19. 
122
 Oran R. Young et al., supra note 14, at 260.
123 YOUNG, GOVERNANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS, supra note 116, at 80.
124
 Id. at 100.
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behavior of individuals and collective entities alike.”125  Young concludes that in many of 
the cases studied the model of a regime as a bestower of authority was an important 
dynamic contributing to the effectiveness of the regime.126  For example, successes 
relating to the international oil pollution regime are partly attributable to the legitimacy 
and authority accorded by states and non-state actors to the regime, allowing the 
promulgation of regulations to address vessel-source marine pollution.127
F. The Enforcement Model: Political Economics Theory
The final theory on the compliance continuum is the enforcement model of political 
economists Downs et al..128   They argue that while coercing compliance is not a panacea, 
enforcement should not be ruled out as an option.  Their theory directly challenges the 
Chayesian approach.  The key critique of the enforcement model is that the managerial 
school misinterprets the evidence.  Downs et al. argue it is a mistake to infer that 
enforcement is unnecessary from the relatively high compliance levels and lack of 
enforcement mechanisms.129  Downs and his co-authors point out that as treaty 
obligations are the result of consensual agreements, states are unlikely to either negotiate, 
or enter into, agreements that contain obligations they are unable to meet. 130   They 
characterize the basis for state selection as “depth of cooperation.”
125
 Young & Levy, supra note 118 at 23.  Note Young & Levy refer to THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER 
OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990) in explaining this model.
126
 Young et al., supra note 14, at 261.
127
 Ronald Mitchell et al., International Vessel-Source Oil Pollution, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES, supra note 15, at 34, 84.
128 Supra note 5.
129 Id.
130
 Downs et al., id. at 382, discuss an orchestra selecting a piece of music to perform at a concert to 
illustrate their point.  In their hypothetical story funding of musical education has been reduced.  To 
consider the effects of the cut backs, the number of mistakes made by an orchestra within a district not 
subject to the funding cuts, and an orchestra subject to the funding cuts is measured.  The number of 
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Depth of cooperation refers to the extent to which a treaty “requires states to depart 
from what they would have done in its absence.”131    According to the Downsian132 view, 
deep cooperation is rare in international accords.133  Downs et al. discuss the set of arms 
agreements made by the United States post 1945 to support their case.  Specifically, the 
Outer Space Treaty,134 the Seabed Arms Control Treaty135 and the Antarctic Treaty136 are 
cited as examples of agreements to maintain the status quo.  Neither the Soviet Union, 
nor the United States had either a strategic mission for a major weapons system in these 
areas, or cost-effective plans at the time the treaties were signed.137  Downs et al.
comment:
While we are not denying that obtaining tangible reassurance of a rival’s 
intentions through a treaty is valuable, it is difficult to argue that these treaties 
exhibit the deep cooperation that would have taken place if the superpowers had 
mistakes is low for both, despite reduced rehearsals for the orchestra subject to funding cuts.  Downs et al. 
argue it is a mistake to conclude from this that funding for rehearsals does not improve performance.  They 
argue that it is likely that the orchestra with fewer rehearsals chose a less demanding piece.  That is,
orchestras are likely to choose their performance repertoire to match their level of ability, preferring not to 
play a demanding piece where they might make mistakes.   Similarly, states enter treaties they know they 
can comply with. 
131 Supra note 5 at 383.
132
 Anastasia A. Angelova, Compelling Compliance with International Regimes: China and the Missile 
Technology Control Regime, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 419, 434 (1999) (refers to the political 
economic theory as “Downsian.”)
133
 Downs et al., supra note 5, at 388.
134 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18(3) U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 
(entered into force Oct. 10, 1967), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/space1.html
135 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass 
Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in The Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23(1) U.S.T. 
701; 955 U.N.T.S. 115 (entered into force May 18, 1972), available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/seabed1.html. 
136
 Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12(1) U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (entered into force June 23, 1961), 
available at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4700.htm. 
137
 Downs et al., supra note 5, at 389.
29
each agreed to terminate major modernization programs or dramatically reduce 
their defense budgets.138
Moreover, they also suggest the probability that if either state significantly broke an 
agreement, the other state would retaliate in kind, supports their case that enforcement 
contributes to compliance.139
Downs et al. argue that an absence of deep cooperation is also evident in international 
environmental law. 140  For example, in contrast to Franck, who cites the Montreal 
Protocol as an effective MEA, Downs et al. are not as convinced.  They refer to studies 
that suggest the Montreal Protocol did not contribute to altering state behavior, as states 
were already committed to reducing chlorofluorocarbon emissions.141   Another example 
discussed by Downs et al. is the Mediterranean Plan,142 which responds to pollution in the 
Mediterranean Sea.  Downs et al. argue the Plan has no meaningful restrictions on 
dumping and pollution has increased.143
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 391.
141
 Scott Barrett, Self-enforcing international environmental agreements, 46 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 878, 
892 (1994); James C. Murdoch  & Todd Sandler, The voluntary provision of a pure public good: The case 
of reduced CFC emissions and the Montreal Protocol 2 (Typescript, 1994), cited in Downs et al., supra
note 4, at 391.  
142
  Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Feb. 16, 1976, (entered into 
force Feb. 12, 1978, (revised in Barcelona, Spain, on June 10, 1995 as the Convention for the Protection of 
the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean, not yet in force), available at
http://www.unep.ch/seas/main/med/medconvi.html [hereinafter the Mediterranean Action Plan].
143 Supra note 4, at 396.  See Jon Birger Skjærsh, The Effectiveness of the Mediterranean Action Plan, in
ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 26, at 311 for an analysis from international relations 
theory considering the effectiveness of the Mediterranean Action Plan.
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Additionally, Downs et al. argue that where they believe MEAs have been successful, 
enforcement played a greater role than the managerialists would credit.  For instance, 
they argue that the creation of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone improved the 
effectiveness of fishing agreements issued under international fisheries commissions, as it 
made enforcement easier.  Before the creation of the exclusive economic zone, Downs 
and his colleagues argue compliance was problematic because states were not pressuring 
their fisherman to obey the rules.144 The key problem was lack of incentive to obey the 
rules where it was perceived others are likely to disobey.145
In sum, the crux of the Downsian view is that there is a connection between the depth 
of cooperation and the level of punishment necessary to maintain compliance where there 
are strong incentives to defect.  “The political economy theory predicts that  … [an] 
increase in the incentive for defection will have to be offset by increases in the size of the 
threatened punishment.”146  As Downs notes, there are difficulties in testing this theory, 
such as the lack of enforcement mechanisms in MEAs.  Moreover, if there are 
enforcement mechanisms that are not used, the effect on negotiations, which took place 
in the “shadow of a more formal enforcement process,” is difficult to determine.147
Despite these difficulties, Downs cites an analysis of fifty environmental agreements as 
evidence supporting the enforcement model.  Each agreement was assigned a depth of 
cooperation score and a level of enforcement score.148  The result was that the strongest 
144 Supra note 5, at 395.
145 Id.
146
 George W. Downs, Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 319, 333 
(1998).  
147 Id. at 332. 
148 Id. at 333. 
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enforcement provisions accompanied the agreements requiring the deepest 
cooperation.149
The Downsian view is a persuasive critique.  As noted in the introduction, despite the 
proliferation of MEAs addressing an extensive range of global environmental problems, 
environmental issues are not being solved.  The enforcement model is the only theory in 
the compliance continuum providing a compelling explanation for this reality.  
Furthermore, Downs is not alone in his caution against dismissing the efficacy of 
coercive enforcement mechanisms, especially where more onerous obligations are 
introduced.150  For example, Victor agrees with Downs et al. that coercive enforcement 
measures are sometimes needed, particularly when the cooperation is deep and incentives 
to defect are high.151  Victor is also critical of the current record of MEAs, concurring 
with Downs that the high compliance rate is explained by shallow cooperation.  One of 
the examples Victor discusses to support his claim that in international cooperation “the 
lowest common denominator prevails,”152 is the regulation of sulfur oxide emissions 
under the 1985 Sulfur Protocol.153  He comments that because sulfur was a leading cause 
149 Id.
150
 Although not in the MEA context, Angelova, supra note 132, at 445 supports the Downsian view that 
enforcement should not be ruled out as an effective compliance mechanism.  She discusses the Missile 
Technology Control Agreement (“MTCA”), which aims to limit the spread of missiles and missile 
technology.  Angelova makes two points that concur with Downs’ view.  First, she argues that original 
members of the MTCA achieved high compliance rates as the agreement was shallow; member states 
agreed to only minimal behavior changes.  Second, when new states entered that had incentives to defect, 
their compliance was secured through sanctions (although the sanctions were external to the MTCA regime 
and imposed unilaterally by the United States).
151
 Victor, supra note 3, at 152 also notes this theory is difficult to prove, as there are few strong 
enforcement mechanisms to analyze.  
152 Id. at 153.
153
 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of 
Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent, July 8, 1985, 1480 U.N.T.S. 
215 (entered into force Sep. 2, 1987) available at
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of urban air pollution several countries were already regulating sulfur oxide emissions 
prior to the conclusion of the 1985 Sulfur Protocol.154  In sum, Victor’s answer to the 
compliance question concurs with Downs: “high compliance is the consequence of 
shallow cooperation.”155
III. TAKING STOCK 
A. Converging Theories?
Overall, the literature reveals that there is no general consensus on why nations 
comply with international law in general, or specifically with MEAs.  However, some 
scholars have suggested that general compliance principles can be drawn from the 
theories, even the ostensibly contradictory views of the management school and the 
enforcement model. 
Danish argues that an analysis of the substance of the managerial school reveals the 
Chayeses are not as opposed to enforcement as they assert.156  He notes that elements of 
the managerial school, such as verification and deterrence are in fact elements of 
enforcement.157  Also, relying on threats of disapproval affecting a state’s reputation to 
secure compliance falls closer to enforcement, rather than management.  According to 
Danish, “[n]o matter how they frame it, the regimes of the New Sovereignty would do 
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu:9080/entri/texts/transboundary.air.pollution.protocol.sulphur.emissions.19
85.html.
154 Supra note 3, at 153.
155 Id. at 152.
156 Supra note 35, at 804.
157 Id.
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more than merely offer technical and financial assistance.  They would also coerce.”158
He re-conceptualizes the Chayesian approach as a managerial strategy and a social 
enforcement strategy,159 where social enforcement refers to enforcement through 
leveraging loss of reputation and standing in the international community.160
Perhaps Danish is correct in suggesting that some of the differences between the 
Chayeses and Downs et al. are semantic, depending on how each theory defines 
enforcement.  Even so, it is clear that the Chayeses are opposed to enforcement in the 
form of sanctions,161 and that Downs et al. are not.   Additionally, as will be further 
discussed below, both approaches fundamentally differ as to the reasons for instances of 
non-compliance.
Keohane also seeks to reconcile the two ends of the compliance continuum, labeling 
the divergent views as the instrumentalist and the normative optic. 162   The 
instrumentalist optic focuses on interests.  According to instrumentalists, “rule and norms 
will matter only if they affect calculations of interests by agents.”163  Instrumentalism is 
largely the domain of political scientists and thus falls at the end of the continuum with 
international relations theory.  Keohane’s normative optic describes international legal 
theory, where the legitimacy of rules explains compliance.  Both Franck’s fairness theory 
and the Chayeses’ managerial approach are classified as normative.   
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Keohane agues that neither the normative or instrumentalist optic adequately explains 
how predicted results follow from the theory’s assumptions.164 In an attempt to 
synthesize the two optics, he suggests that interests, reputations and institutions are 
common to the causal pathways of both optics.  Instrumentalists’ interests are  “power, 
wealth, and position (position in the international system with regard to states and offices 
for individuals).”165  However, while Keohane argues international lawyers also consider 
interests, he notes it is a legitimate concern (also raised by political scientists) that it can 
be difficult to identify whose, and which, interest.166
The importance of reputation in encouraging compliance is also common to both 
optics.167  But, Keohane points out that reputation encompasses not only a reputation for 
keeping agreements, but can be “less savory,” such as for punishing enemies and does not 
always encourage compliance.168  Downs and Jones also argue reputation is not as 
simplistic as legal theorists suggest.169  In considering the importance of reputation, 
Downs and Jones conclude that first, nations have varying levels of reliability in relation 
to different agreements.170  Secondly, considerable evidence supports the contention that 
states possess multiple or segmented reputations.171  In the MEA context Downs and 
Jones argue that presently, defection appears to have narrow implications for treaties in 
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other areas.  They conclude that in international environmental regulation reputation 
contributes the least to promoting compliance.172
The linchpin of Keohane’s synthesis is institutions.  Again, he argues both optics 
believe institutions matter.173  However, Keohane emphasizes the importance of 
institutions as they allow the fusion of the normative and instrumentalist optic.  
According to Keohane, interests depend on reputations.174   He argues that interests are 
changeable, depending on information, as well as causal beliefs and principled beliefs.  
Therefore, Keohane argues norms influence interests.  Reputational concerns also 
influence interests.  And, to complete the argument, reputations depend on institutions, as 
they  “affect what kind of reputation it is most useful to acquire.”175
Finally, in considering the possible convergence of the differing theories along the 
compliance continuum, legitimacy emerges as a crucial consideration.  While only 
Franck puts legitimacy at the center of his analysis, the Chayeses, Guzman and Young all 
note that the use of enforcement raises legitimacy issues.  Although not directly 
considering the compliance question in international law, Brunnee and Toope reach a 
similar conclusion, commenting that “ …  the penchant of some international lawyers for 
demanding “enforcement” of a supposed norm will often prove ineffective if there is no 
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common acceptance of the norm’s legitimacy.”176  Moreover, Bodansky argues that the 
search for legitimacy is the coming challenge of international environmental law.177
Bodansky claims that to effectively respond to global environmental problems, 
stronger institutions and decision-making mechanisms not dependent on consensus 
among states are required.178  Although consent has traditionally formed the justification 
of authority in international environmental law, consensus decision-making usually 
results in weak agreements,179 or in Downsian terminology “shallow cooperation.”  
However, stronger international governance based on non-consensual decision-making 
raises the question of legitimacy, defined by Bodansky as the “justification for 
authority.”180   He argues that owing to the lack of an international demos, democracy 
cannot fill the legitimacy deficit.181  Therefore, Bodansky calls for further work on how 
to legitimize international environmental regimes.182
The most vocal proponent of enforcement, Downs, does not directly respond to the 
legitimacy challenge.183  Nonetheless, it is not clear that Downs is only advocating for 
unilateral sanctions, which pose the biggest legitimacy threat.  Therefore, attempting to 
legitimize the use of enforcement within a MEA framework may contribute to 
reconciling the key point of contention, whether enforcement encourages compliance.  
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B. Key Points of Contention
The literature divides over the use of enforcement.  The Chayeses advocate the 
extreme view that enforcement will not prevent non-compliance.  In contrast, the 
instrumentalists say, that when there are incentives to defect, enforcement is required.  
The underlying disagreement is therefore, not why nations comply, but why sometimes, 
they do not.
The Chayeses argue non-compliance with an international law is not because of 
willful disobedience.  Rather, as noted above, it is because of uncertainty in the terms of 
the treaty, lack of capacity or modified circumstances.  Therefore, the use of sanctions 
would not have any effect on compliance, as it would not influence any of the causal 
factors leading to defection.
The instrumentalists challenge those reasons.  According to Guzman and Downs et al., 
states disobey international law when it is in their interest to do so.184   Moreover, Downs 
argues that it is difficult to test the managerial reasons of non-compliance, as they do not 
necessarily preclude premeditated defection.185  First, Downs is cynical about the extent 
to which ambiguity really explains non-compliance.  He notes the political economy 
model would “suspect that ambiguity is often built into the agreement intentionally as a 
device that negotiators can use strategically to reap the political benefits of reaching an 
agreement when one might otherwise not be achieved.”186  Secondly, Downs argues that 
capacity limitations may also be related to deliberate non-compliance.  For example, 
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administrators responsible for implementing the detail of an agreement may not be under 
the perfect control of the policymakers responsible for signing the agreement.  The 
administrator may, according to Downs, “find it more profitable or simply easier to do a 
less vigorous job of implementation than he might be capable.”187
However, it is important to emphasize that Downs et al. only support enforcement 
when the stakes are high.  This follows from their central contention that the shallowness 
of current MEAs explains the high compliance rate.  If what has been agreed to 
represents current domestic policies, then non-compliance is not an issue.  The Chayeses, 
Franck and Koh do not adequately respond to this.  In doing so, the normative theories 
appear to overlook a key empirical observation relating to the shallowness of many 
MEAs.  
To be fair, all three normative theories do not explicitly focus on compliance and 
MEAs.  Rather, they are developing a general theory of compliance with international 
law.  However, as a general theory, it should be applicable to any policy area.  This essay 
suggests that either all three theories are incomplete, or that, understanding compliance 
with MEAs requires separate consideration.
C. Suggestions for Further Research
Accordingly, further research is required to ascertain whether any general theory of 
compliance is possible.  The Chayeses, Franck, Koh and Guzman all consider the 
compliance question in the broader context of international law as a whole.  It is not clear 
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that any such general theory is possible.  Young comments that, “[t]here is no reason to 
assume that international institutions – or any other social institutions will be equally 
effective (or ineffective) across space, time, and issue area.”188  For example, the reason 
nations may or may not comply with international humans rights law, may differ to 
international environmental law.  Young also agues, that within the environmental 
context there may not be one model regime applicable to all environmental issues.189
Rather than seeking for a “recipe” to apply across the board, he suggests we should 
interpret each problem based on understandings gained from in depth analysis of other 
problems.
Additionally, in evaluating whether the recent call for stronger enforcement is 
necessary to secure compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, and other MEAs, scholars 
should focus their research on why nations defect from MEAs, as this remains one of the 
key points of contention.   As noted by Keohane, “[t]o understand success, we need to 
understand failure.”190
Finally, further research is required into possible stronger enforcement mechanisms, as 
there are few models.   In considering possibilities, scholars should concentrate on the 
legitimacy of these mechanisms, given that the lack of legitimacy is a common concern 
among theorists opposed to enforcement.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, despite the recent proliferation of literature addressing the compliance 
question, scholars remain divided as to why nations obey international law.  The 
literature reveals a contest between the Chayesian approach arguing for managing 
compliance, and the Downsian view supporting enforcement when there are high 
incentives to defect.  While these two views represent both ends of the compliance 
continuum, not all scholars engage in the debate.  Koh in particular, takes a different tack 
to the compliance question, focusing instead on the domestic internalization of 
international norms.
However, in the context of MEAs, as countries focus on implementing the numerous 
treaties in force, the resolution of the compliance question is a big issue.  As noted in the 
introduction, during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations nations believed an increase in 
obligations beyond those in the FCCC should be accompanied by stronger enforcement 
mechanisms.  Was that sentiment well founded?
My answer to the question do we need stronger enforcement mechanisms to secure 
compliance with MEAs, is yes, when there are strong incentives to defect.  Moreover, 
increasing the effectiveness of the international response to global environmental 
problems calls for more onerous obligations, thereby creating stronger incentives to 
defect, and the depth of cooperation.  To be effective, however, stronger enforcement 
mechanisms must posses legitimacy.  Creating legitimate enforcement mechanisms to 
secure compliance with MEAs exhibiting deeper cooperation is the key to reconciling the 
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disparate ends of the compliance continuum, and address global environmental 
degradation. 
